



Professor Gary Knight has taken exception to the conclusions of our previous
article' on the subject matter and expounded his own personal philosophies on
the creation of wealth and development which he implies to be the privilege of
private citizens or corporations. We shall not pursue here this philosophical or
political exchange but, instead, are constrained to expand on the legal issues
previously raised and still pending at the UNLOS negotiations.
I. Basic Distinction
The multiple questions raised by the claim for exclusive mining rights by
Deepsea Ventures, Inc. (hereinafter "Deepsea") may be examined from different
perspectives: (i) those of the private mining industry; (ii) United States National
Policy; and, (iii) public international law.
Both the motivation and purposes of private industry in the development of
ocean mining are simple enough and require little elaboration. Qualified
representatives of the industry have in nonambiguous terms stated their view
together with their firm advocacy for United States unilateral action: "The
venture should not only have the opportunity for profit making, but also, if it does
an excellent job, it should have the opportunity to make an excellent profit." 2
Without disputing the legitimacy of this outlook, which is not different from that
which guides any other business, its limited scope makes it, in our view, clearly
insufficient for shaping public policy.
On the other hand, the considerations guiding United States policy, while not
excluding the interests of private industry, are understandably based on the
overall present and future economic needs of the country. From this perspective,
the figures are startling: the United States presently imports 96 percent of its total
*Author of several works on the Law of the Sea in his native country, Chile. Mr. Biggs is now
working in Washington, D.C. in the Legal Department of the Interamerican Development Bank.
The views of this article represent the personal opinion of the author and not of his institution.
'91NT'L LAW. 751-53 (1975).
'Marne A. Dubs, "Law and Policy in Mining the Ocean Floor: The Industrial Perspective," p. 62,
Proceedings of the John Basset Moore Society of International Law Symposium and the ASIL
Regional Meeting, Charlottesville, Virginia, November 16, 1974.
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consumption of cobalt, 95 percent of its manganese, 75 percent of its nickel, and
19 percent of its copper. Moreover, the United States Department of the Interior
estimates that by 1990 the United States could be self-sufficient in nickel, copper
and cobalt and reduce its imports of manganese to 23 percent of its consumption,
provided the private seabed mining industry is permitted to start with its
operations immediately. 3
The significance of the above figures was unquestionably behind the
recommendation of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and
Atmosphere that "Legislation be enacted to encourage and regulate deep seabed
mining by the United States private industry to the end that the minerals of the
deep seabed will be available to decrease United States dependence on foreign
sources and to increase world supply." 4
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that, however valid the
preceding considerations may be to the national interest and needs of the United
states, they certainly are not different from those of other countries, particularly
those which presently have to import 100 percent of their consumption of cobalt,
manganese, nickel or copper and which would likewise welcome the development
of alternative resources in order to decrease their foreign dependence. Regardless
of how important these economic realities may be to individual countries, they
definitely do not offer, on our view, a conclusive perspective for resolving one of
the most important problems of public international law of modern times. We
feel, then, that-whatever may be their merit in their respective fields-we must
extricate from this analysis those considerations related to the interests of private
industry or individual countries which, in our view, have no direct concern to the
development of an equitable principle of law for the mineral resources of the high
seas. We, instead, support the following statement of Ambassador John Norton
Moore:
The United States will go to the . Law of the Sea Conference prepared to negotiate
a just and timely agreement, an agreement which we feel not only will serve our
national interests, but also will serve the interests of all mankind .... Accordingly,
we hope that all nations will keep before them the great preface of the Charter of the
United Nations: That the Peoples of the United Nations will "establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom for all mankind." 5
H. Deepsea's Claim and the LOS Negotiations
With little explanation we are asked to examine the problems raised by a
3
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unilateral claim of exclusive mining rights in the high seas against a blazing
scenario of inflamed rhetoric and confrontation, with Ambassador Moynihan
and Deepsea on one side and the developing nations on the other. Although no
fruitful purpose would be served by perpetuating this emotional approach, a few
comments are in order: First, the record shows that Deepsea's claim was officially
rejected by Canada (December 6, 1974), the United Kingdom (January 20, 1975)
and Australia (March 18, 1975),6 which are not exactly developing countries. The
other is that the balance of power in today's world is different from that which
prevailed at the time of the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, or the
Conference of San Francisco. The law which emerges from the LOS negotiations
will have to reflect this reality-however imperfect-or else there will be no law.
Failure to recognize this changing reality would lead us to that dreaded chaos
announced by Ambassador Moore "in which even great power prevails at great
cost." 7
H. Res Nulllus or Common Heritage?
As if unburying Grotius were not enough, we are now being dragged to old
Rome in search of a legal justification for Deepsea's action. Res nullius in 1976?
Well, the record of official United States policy would not support this
sophistication: On July 13, 1966, President Johnson stated: "Under no
circumstances . . . must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral
wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations.
We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the high
seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and ocean bottoms are, and remain the
legacy of all human beings." 8 On August 30, 1968, the United States voted for the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations established by General
Assembly Resolution 2340, of December 18, 1967, which stated that the
exploration and use of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof and the
exploitation of their resources should be carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of mankind. 9 On December 21, 1968, the United States voted for General
Assembly Resolution 2467 A which stated the conviction that the exploitation of
the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof should be carried out for
the benefit of mankind as a whole taking into account the special interests and
needs of the developing countries. 1 o On May 23, 1970, a statement by President
Nixon proposed that all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which
they would renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed
Tnternational Legal Materials, January and May 1975, pp. 67, 795-96.7Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Committee on Commetce, U.S. Senate,
June 3, 1975, p. 9.
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beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters and would agree
to regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind. I On August 3,
1970, the United States submitted before the United Nations Seabed Committee
a draft which stated that the International Seabed Area as defined therein shall
be the common heritage of mankind.' 2 Finally, on December 17, 1970, the
United States voted for Regulation 2749 of the General Assembly, (Declaration of
Principles) which:
Recognizing that the existing legal regime of the high seas does not provide substantive
rules for regulating the exploitation of the aforesaid area and exploitation of its
resources,
declared that:
No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with
respect to the area or its resources incompatible with ... the principles of this
Declaration."
Among the principles approved was Article 1 which provided:
The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area) as well as the resources of the area, are
the common heritage of mankind.'4
If, by virtue of the above, it became the official United States position that the
resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor and of the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction "arethe common heritage of mankind" and that no
State or person, natural or juridical, may claim, exercise or acquire rights with
respect to those resources, with what authority can it be asserted that these same
resources are recognized by international law as "res nullius" subject to
exploitation by any citizen?
We are aware of the technicalities expressed with regard to the United Nations
Resolutions in the sense that they are only "advisory," "declaratory" or
"recommendatory" and, therefore, not binding. However, this last contention
has been cogently disputed by several authors'" which affirm that agreements or
resolutions-different from treaties-which evidence the formal consent of
States, constitute valid principles of international law. With great precision
Professor Castafieda has stated: "The recognition and formal expression of a
customary rule or a general principle of law by the General Assembly constitutes a
juris et de jure presumption that such a rule or principle is a part of positive
international law, that is to say, a legal assumption or fiction that does not allow
proof to the contrary, and in the face of which an opposing individual position
"Shigeru Oda, id., p. 343.
11d., p. 73 UN Doc. A/AC 138/25.
"1D., p. 44.
"Id. (Emphasis supplied)
"Jorge Castafieda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions, Columbia University Press, 1969,
p. 172; Edmundo Vargas, America Latina y el Derecho del Mar, Mexico, 1973, p. 106.
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therefore lacks legal efficacy. ''16
Notwithstanding the weight of the above opinion, we shall assume, for the sake
of argument, the General Assembly Resolutions do not create international law
binding upon all members of the United Nations whether they voted for such
resolutions or not.17 Even under this assumption, it would appear inconceivable
that support could be granted to actions totally adverse to both the text and spirit
of such Resolutions from the same countries which voted affirmatively for them,
particularly when, in the case of those United Nation Resolutions which the
United States has voted against (Moratorium Resolution), the State Department
through Ambassador Stevenson has asserted that they must be given "good faith
consideration.""8
Whichever is the right interpretation of the concept "common heritage of
mankind," it, most likely, is the opposite of "res nullius." This last concept was
developed by the Romans in their property law and applied to those things
belonging to nobody either because they had been abandoned (res derelicta) or
never been incorporated to private ownership, as in the case of wild birds, fish or
animals. The act by which a person acquired ownership of a "res nullius" was
"occupation." In common law countries occupation is utilized to describe the
manner by which a person can legally obtain ownership of a mining deposit and,
in most cases, this ownership is granted to the first discoverer. However, the
theory of res nullius and occupation in domestic mining law within the Western
Hemisphere is not universal, there being several important countries which
regulate the matter differently.
But the main question is, how can a principle of domestic mining law developed
in the past by one particular country and for one specific purpose be converted
into a principle of international law applicable to all countries and for a
completely different undertaking?
With due respect to the prominent scholars who have devoted time and effort
searching for that missing link which would enable private individuals to develop
the hard minerals of the deep sea-bed under the protective umbrella of
international law, the sad truth is, in our opinion, that there is no justifiable
formulation for such approach.
It certainly is not easy in the nineteen seventies to find legal precedents in
someway related to a technology totally unknown in the fifties or early sixties.
However, the following cases have been cited: Palmas, 19 Clipperton2 O and Eastern
"Jorge Castaieda, supra note 15.
"Editor's Note: This assumption, in fact, is the view shared by the present legal counsel of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
"Hearings on S. 2801-Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 2nd Session, 1972, pp. 74-75.
"See William W. Bishop, Jr. International Law, C-Ges and-N'aterials, Little, Brown and Co., 1962,
p. 345.
"Id., p. 352.
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Greenland.21 All refer to territorial disputes between sovereign states stretching
out from the 19th century and resolved in 1928 (Palmas), 1932 (Clipperton) and
1933 (Eastern Greenland). The law emerging from these cases referred to
land-not resources-and to sovereign States-not individuals. Their relation to
the exploitation of mineral resources by individuals is, therefore, zero.
Professor Goldie has unfrozen the Spitzbergen case related to a territorial
dispute stretching out for several centuries and resolved by the Treaty of Paris,
February 9, 1920.22 Its relevance would be in that the Treaty "recognized and
preserved the established rights of citizens of the signatory countries to exploit
their coal and other mineral holdings and to fish in Spitzbergen waters." 3 It
should be noted that: (i) once again this is a land dispute between States; (ii) the
recognition of private citizens' rights referred to therein is a typical compromise
in a land settlement dispute with no significance to general international law;
and, (iii) the private rights to coal and other mineral holdings and to fish
continued to be exercised in accordance to the domestic laws of Norway (whose
sovereignty was recognized by the Treaty) and not in accordance to any principle
of international law.
Finally, there is the contention that recognition of rights over pearls, sponges,
oysters and the like, prior to the Convention of the Continental Shelf, would
evidence the existence of a principle applicable to present ocean mining.24
However, those rights were granted to coastal States as a recognition of the
extension of their territories (as was later confirmed by the Convention), but never
to thefirst discoverer. The clear conclusion is, then, that the mineral resources of
the high seas have not been recognized under any known principle of interna-
tional law as "res nullius" susceptible of occupation by the first discoverer but
have been declared by the United States and 107 other nations to be the common
heritage of mankind and, as such, not susceptible to acquisition or exploitation
by states or persons, natural or juridical.
IV. The Search for a Principle
For those who advocate exploitation of the mineral resources of the high seas by
private individuals the long sought principle that would authorize such
exploitation would have to declare that it is amongst the freedoms of the oceans
recognized by existing international law. However, the 1958 Convention of the
High Seas, which specifically regulated this matter, provides substantial evidence
precisely against this possibility. Article 2, after enumerating the different
"Id.. p. 355.
22L.F.E. Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabed Regimes, Int'l Lawyer,
October, 1973, p. 796.
"Id., p. 809.
"See 9 INT'L LAW. 271.
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freedoms (navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines and
overflying the high seas) states that "these freedoms, and others which are
recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas" (emphasis added)."5
One serious caveat is, of course, that the Convention refers to the exercise of
such freedoms by States and not by individuals like Deepsea.
But there is more.
A distinguished expert, Mr. John G. Laylin 2 6 has elaborated that one of the
freedoms not listed but recognized by the Convention would be the right to
explore and exploit the mineral resources of the seabed beyond state jurisdiction.
His interpretation is based in the Report of the International Law Commission
which drafted the final text of the Convention. 2 However, our reading of the
pertinent paragraphs of this Report is different from his: Paragraph 5 reads:
Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it, must be
regulated (emphasis added).
In conjunction with the above, Paragraph 2 states:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore or exploit
the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the case of the exploitation
or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continental shelf-a case dealt with separately
in Section III below-such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical
importance to justify special regulation (emphasis added).
It follows, then, that the only exploration or exploitation of the subsoil conceived
by the Commission was that of the subsoil of the continental shelf (regulated by
the Convention thereon and which only envisaged exploration and exploitation
up to depths of 200 meters). Moreover, it provided that special regulation was a
mandatory requisite for the exercise of the freedoms of the oceans. Hence, if the
exploration and exploitation of the subsoil of the high seas was not deemed to be
of sufficient importance as to be regulated, then its exercise became not only
inconceivable but, also, legally impossible. The obvious conclusion, then, is that
the opinion of the International Law Commission and that of the countries which
approved the 1958 Convention of the High Seas was that there was no existing
principle of international law authorizing deep ocean mining of the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. We can add that the first serious
attempt by the international community to regulate this matter occurred in 1970
with the approval by 108 countries of the principle of the common heritage of
mankind the regulation of which is the main purpose, amongst others, of the still
pending LOS negotiations.
"'Shigeru Oda,-id., p. 9.
2614 COLUM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1975).
"YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Vol. II, 1956, Report to the General
Assembly, Document A/3159, p. 278.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 2
316 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
V. Unilateral Action?
Having demonstrated, we submit, that no existing principle of international
law would authorize deep seabed ocean mining beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, it is our conviction that to achieve a successful LOS negotiation the
resulting international agreement must meet the interests of all the nations
concerned, developed and developing. In this context we welcome the firm
leadership exerted by the United States Executive which has until now success-
fully prevented the enactment of unilateral actions that would seriously disrupt
the possibilities of achieving such agreement. It is fairly clear that-as opposed to
the unilateral extension of the fisheries jurisdiction of the coastal State up to 200
miles, in which virtual consensus exists in the world community-unilateral
action in deep sea-bed mining would provoke world upheaval and uncertainty of
every sort. What is more, such action would be clearly illegal and easily
challenged at the International Court of Justice. 8
We, therefore, agree fully with the following policy statement of the Secretary
of State: '
We prefer a generally acceptable international agreement that provides a stable legal
environment before deep sea-bed mining actually begins. The responsibility for
achieving an agreement before actual exploitation begins is shared by all nations.2"
2 For an analysis of the existing alternatives, see James C. Orr, "The Economic Effects of Deep
Ocean Mineral Mining and the Implications to the U.S. Policy," p. 38, Ocean Policy Project, The
Johns Hopkins University, Occasional Paper Series No. 4.
"Speech of the Secretary of State before the American Bar Association Annual Convention, August
11, 1975, Montreal, Canada.
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